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Abstract
Background: The widespread sharing of biological and biomedical data is recognised as a key element in facilitating
translation of scientific discoveries into novel clinical applications and services. At the same time, twenty-first century
states are increasingly concerned that this data could also be used for purposes of bioterrorism. There is thus a tension
between the desire to promote the sharing of data, as encapsulated by the Open Data movement, and the desire to
prevent this data from ‘falling into the wrong hands’ as represented by ‘dual use’ policies. Both frameworks posit a
moral duty for life sciences researchers with respect to how they should make their data available. However, Open data
and dual use concerns are rarely discussed in concert and their implementation can present scientists with potentially
conflicting ethical requirements.
Discussion: Both dual use and Open data policies frame scientific data and data dissemination in particular, though different,
ways. As such they contain implicit models for how data is translated. Both approaches are limited by a focus on abstract
conceptions of data and data sharing. This works to impede consensus-building between the two ethical frameworks. As an
alternative, this paper proposes that an ethics of responsible management of scientific data should be based on a more
nuanced understanding of the everyday data practices of life scientists. Responsibility for these ‘micromovements’ of data
must consider the needs and duties of scientists as individuals and as collectively-organised groups.
Summary: Researchers in the life sciences are faced with conflicting ethical responsibilities to share data as widely as possible,
but prevent it being used for bioterrorist purposes. In order to reconcile the responsibilities posed by the Open Data and dual
use frameworks, approaches should focus more on the everyday practices of laboratory scientists and less on abstract
conceptions of data.
Background
In 1627 Francis Bacon wrote “[w]e have consultations, which
of the inventions and experiences which we have discovered
shall be published and which not; and all take an oath of se-
crecy for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep
secret” [1] paragraph 87. Despite its age, the quote is as top-
ical today as on the day it was written, as it exemplifies a
perennial concern of scientists: what constitutes respon-
sible management of data? In particular, how can be bene-
fits of sharing data be balanced by the possibility that
some shared data may have the potential to cause harm?
In the twenty first century, these familiar tensions
are being reshaped by a range of developments from
the widespread use of information communication
technologies (ICTs) to post-9/11 global security con-
cerns. Two key concepts that exemplify these changes
are ‘dual use’ and Open Data. The former advocates
the careful scrutiny and possible control of published
scientific data to ameliorate threats of bioterrorism,
while the latter advocates the maximal dissemination
of both published and unpublished scientific data to
facilitate optimal re-use.
How dual-use concerns might be reconciled with
Open Data expectations is of considerable significance
for shaping scientific practices and influencing the pol-
icies that control research. Indeed, in an increasingly
“data-centric” age, understanding how the possible
* Correspondence: michael.morrison@dph.ox.ac.uk
3Centre for Health, Law and Emerging Technologies (HeLEX), Nuffield
Department of Population Health, University of Oxford, Ewert House Banbury
Road, Oxford OX2 7DD, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 Bezuidenhout and Morrison. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link
to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication
waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise
stated.
Bezuidenhout and Morrison BMC Medical Ethics  (2016) 17:29 
DOI 10.1186/s12910-016-0112-6
harms of disseminating research should be reconciled
with the benefits of increasing openness and access to
data are crucial for future scientific development. More-
over, as translational medicine increasingly becomes a
driving force in visions of healthcare, better understanding
of how translation- especially the ‘T1’ phase of translation
of findings from basic science to (clinical) application—
can be ethically undertaken is vital. Given that sharing
scientific data is regarded as a significant component in
fostering translational research both frameworks also have
implications for how translation operates in practice.
Understanding open data and dual-use discussions
Dual-use and Open Data concerns have recently become
a key topic in funding applications. When scientists
apply for funding, they are regularly confronted with
statements that reflect specific aspects of data manage-
ment, vis Open Data or dual-use concerns. These are
often very similar to the ones below:
“It is the responsibility of institutions in receipt of
Wellcome Trust funding to ensure that any risks that
research could be misused for harmful purposes are
managed in an appropriate manner. Please confirm
that you have considered whether your proposed
research could generate outcomes that could be
misused for harmful purposes.”1
“Our position statement on data management and
sharing requires that all of our funded researchers
maximise the availability of their research data
with as few restrictions as possible.”2
At first glance synthesizing these two requirements
into a holistic data management plan may not seem so
difficult to resolve. Could scientists not simply balance
their ethical duties by making data freely available except
when there are compelling reasons not to do so? After
all, a similar approach has been applied to disseminating
sensitive data concerning human subjects [2, 3]. Indeed,
considered in the abstract (and using prevalent examples
of data management such as those from clinical trials or
nuclear research), the ethical duties of an individual
scientist may seem relatively straightforward, but once
consideration turns to operationalization it is much less
obvious what these responsibilities might mean in terms
of the everyday practices of routine scientific work.
Even if taken at face value, it is evident that much of
the responsibility for data management is placed on the
individual researcher who needs to make strategic deci-
sions not only about benefits and harms, but also about
what data to share, how and why. This places consider-
able expectations on scientists not only practically, but
also from an ethical perspective—as it is often argued
that scientists hold some responsibility regarding the
outcomes of their research (for example [4]).
The provision of ethics education for scientists is not
without its challenges and limitations. Although scien-
tists may receive training in the ‘responsible conduct of
research’ they are generally not well-versed in how to
reconcile competing policy demands, and ethics training
within the scientific community remains patchy and
unstandardized [5]. Without considerable further efforts
to improve ethics training at undergraduate and post-
graduate levels, it is difficult to see how the ethical
responsibilities of data management can be reasonably
expected from the scientific community.
Moreover, as discussed in this paper, making such
expectations of scientists is further problematic for two
important reasons: first, that discussions on data man-
agement tend to be articulated at the level of research
directions rather than the individual data generation and
dissemination activities that make up the daily work of
scientists. Second, that Open Data and dual use dis-
courses differ considerably in their perspectives of what
constitutes “data”, “dissemination” and by extension,
translation, making easy reconciliation of responsibilities
highly problematic.
In order to illustrate this, a brief account of the dual
use and Open Data movements will be presented. In
particular, attention will be drawn to what are prioritized
as “data”, under what channels they move, and where
the lines are drawn between important and “unimportant”
data and dissemination pathways. This will be used to
draw out the different framings of scientific responsibility
in the two frameworks. The remainder of the paper will
emphasize the limitations of each framework, with refer-
ence to translation, and offer suggestions towards recon-
ciling and uniting these disparate discussions. It should be
noted that both Open Data and dual use frameworks
cover scientific data from a range of fields and are not
explicitly or specifically concerned with data derived from
or concerning human subjects. The issues around security
and dissemination of sensitive human data are addressed
in depth elsewhere and are therefore not significant part
of the analysis that follows.
Dual-use: addressing the threat of bioterrorism
The September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre
in 2001 and the subsequent posting of Anthrax-infected
letters through the US mail service produced a heightened
concern with terrorism in many nations. In particular the
Anthrax attacks drew attention to the potentially destruc-
tive role that scientific research could play in future terror
attacks—heralding growing concerns about “bioterrorism”.
Led by the US, many governments started to question
whether the very information that was being generated
for beneficial research could also be misapplied for
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destructive purposes. These concerns came to be known
as “dual-use concerns” [6] and have since become topics
of considerable discussion—particularly within the life
sciences. The securitization of dual-use discussion has
been highly influential and caused the issue to be:
“moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the
realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with
swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and
regulations of policy making” ([7], p. 748).3
From the outset, the dual-use discussion in the life
sciences focused on the potential misapplication of
research results. The appearance of several high-profile
journal articles detailing research that was regarded as
having considerable potential for such misapplication
further reinforced this focus. These research articles,
such as the synthesis of a super-virulent mousepox virus
[8], the resurrection and sequencing of the 1918 Spanish
Flu virus (For an overview see [9]) and the de novo syn-
thesis of the polio virus [10] have all played key roles in
the development of the dual-use discussion and have
been highly influential as case studies for ascertaining
how dual-use threats could be ameliorated.
In the first decade of the 21st century a number of
highly influential reports were issued in order to delin-
eate these concerns within the life sciences. The first,
issued by the US National Research Council (NRC), was
entitled Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism
[11] and focused attention to a list of “experiments of
concern” (dual-use research of concern: “DURCs”4)—re-
search with considerable potential for weaponization. A
second, from the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB), Globalization, Biosecurity and
the Future of the Life Sciences [12], advocated the estab-
lishment of a “web of prevention” model taking into
consideration the multifaceted actions needed to ad-
dress dual-use concerns. Both these reports focused
on the risks posed by the possible misuse of published
research [13].
Subsequent dual-use discussions have been heavily
influenced by these reports, and have predominantly
focused on the possible dangers posed by published
research—particularly in emerging fields such as nano-
technology and synthetic biology [7]. As a result, much
of the discussion has focused on whether results should
be published or not. In 2003 the editors of 23 journals—in-
cluding Nature and Science—proposed the establishment of
“pre-publication review” of potentially harmful publications
[14]. This “extra tier” of review for biosecurity concerns has
subsequently been employed by a considerable number of
other journals, although as yet no publications have been
rejected for security purposes.5 Requirements to identify
dual-use concerns have also rapidly started to appear as
components of the grant application forms employed by
many high profile funders such as the NIH and Wellcome
Trust. While there are, of course, problems associated with
identifying the possible harms arising from a specific
research project, there has been considerable support for
further development in this field [13].
Dual-use discourse thus makes use of very specific
interpretations of “data” and “dissemination”. The very
influential reports published by the NRC [11, 15] and
NSABB [12] clearly direct attention towards published
articles [7, 13]—and away from so-called ‘raw data’, re-
positories and databases. Similarly, the focus is predom-
inantly towards peer-reviewed journals—and away from
informal dissemination pathways, crowd research and
discussion forums. The important role allocated to
DURCs as both thought experiments and the basis for
policy development is evidence of this distinction.
The framing of precaution and control has been highly
influential in not only the dual-use discourse, but also
the codes of conduct, regulations, data statements and
legislation resulting from it that pertain to individual re-
sponsibility. A 2007 publication by the NSABB noted this
responsibility, saying that: “[i]ndividuals involved in any
stage of life sciences research have an ethical obligation to
avoid or minimize the risks and harm that could result
from malevolent use of research outcomes” ([16] p. 9) Such
statements were recently lauded in a paper by Selgelid that
noted: “[a] virtue of much of the emerging dual-use ethics
literature is that it takes seriously the idea that individual
scientists have significant responsibilities regarding the
prevention of harm resulting from malevolent use of their
research” ([17], p. 30).
These responsibilities for scientists, as summarised by
Kuhlau et al, include: “the duty not to publish or share
sensitive information, […] the duty to oversee or limit
access to dangerous materials, [and] the duty to report
activities of concern” ([4], pp. 483–486). This sentiment
of vigilance and control is, of course, extended beyond
the scientific community to the multiple stakeholders
involved in biosecurity. This is recognized by numerous
funders and governmental bodies, for example: “[t]he
BBSRC, MRC and WT consider that in order to address
these legitimate concerns, it is important that appropriate
processes exist at institutional, national and international
levels for the review and oversight of research that could
potentially be misused to cause harm. The funders have
stressed the need for researchers to identify, consider and
report cases of potential concern” ([18], p. 2).
From the quotes above it is evident that the responsi-
bilities of scientists are assumed to pertain to “data” gen-
erally. Nonetheless, as the representation of “data” as
research publications in academic journals and DURCs
are most influential in problematizing these discussions,
these discussions on extended responsibilities are influ-
enced by this legacy. In consequence (as evident above),
discussions on responsibility seem to portray data as
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discrete packets of information that travel as units along
linear pathways. 6 This lends itself to the idea of scien-
tists as “gatekeepers”, “a surveillance network” [19] or
the “first line of defence” [20] in dual-use control. Scien-
tists, in this framing, thus may act responsibly by alerting
the wider community to items of data that may be
diverted for nefarious purposes, or by blocking the dis-
semination of that data.
This framing of “data” is, of course, very specific, and
there has already been discussion within the dual-use
community about how effectively any sort of control of
information can hope to be—particularly in the increas-
ingly digital world. Nonetheless, despite these criticisms,
dual-use discussions have yet to critically engage with
other framings of “data” and their movement—as will be
elaborated on below. Indeed, how dual-use responsibility
for pre-publication data (particularly sequence data),
methodologies, and extended metadata are understood
remains unclear. Similarly, how scientists’ act upon dual-
use responsibilities outside of the formal avenues of data
dissemination require much further investigation.
Open Data: ensuring the maximal re-use of research data
The move towards Open Data (and Open Access) has
been facilitated by advances in ICTs. Digital and internet
technologies have removed many of the traditional bar-
riers to the widespread dissemination of scientific infor-
mation such as distance and speed of transmission [21].
Improvements in computing power and automation
have also changed the scale of scientific data generation.
In genomics, for example, high-throughput sequencing
technology has heralded a transformation from “small-
scale, single-molecule, laboratory-based research to large-
scale, in silica research, in which tens of thousands of
genes, transcripts, and/or proteins can be studied simul-
taneously” ([22], p. xi).
The push for greater sharing of scientific data however,
comes primarily as a result of particular policy goals.
More widespread availability of scientific data is seen as
having the potential to improve the reproducibility of
experiments and increase transparency, which in turn
has been regarded as a mechanism to safeguard public
trust in science [23, 24]. Another major thrust of the
Open Data movement is the idea that making scientific
data ‘maximally available’ will in turn maximise the use
and reuse of this data in ways that will increase both
scientific and economic productivity and allow states to
increase the likely returns on their investment in publicly
funded science [23, 25]. This conception of widespread
data reuse ties in with accounts of ‘big data’ that em-
phasise the productive possibilities of combining large
data sets to yield novel scientific insights [26]. Increased
data sharing is also a necessary corollary of a move
away from a “one-scientist-one-project” approach towards
larger, geographically distributed, collaborative pro-
jects in science with greater potential to address ‘global
challenges’ [27].
In this respect the Human Genome Project (HGP) has
been an important template for the Open Data move-
ment [21]. Although there were earlier examples of data
sharing infrastructures such as the NIH-funded GenBank
database of SNP sequences founded in the 1980s, the
HGP produced the high-profile Bermuda principles for
(genomic) data sharing on which subsequent data dis-
semination agreements such as the Toronto statement are
based [28]. The different laboratories working on the
publicly funded HGP agreed to publish each sequence
fragment larger than 1000 base pairs within 24 h of gener-
ation to a publicly accessible website [28] This set a basis
for the pre-publication dissemination of data which has
since been adopted by funders such as the NIH, Wellcome
Trust and the Research Councils of the UK among others
[2]. Although the Bermuda principles for data sharing
were developed in the particular context of genomic data
in the HGP, by the time of the Toronto statement in 2009
the remit has expanded to include prepublication dis-
semination of “large reference data sets in biology and
medicine that have broad utility” including “chemical
structure, metabolomic and RNA interference data sets,
and […] annotated clinical resources (cohorts, tissue banks
and case-control studies)” ([28], p. 168). Of course sharing
human data, especially sensitive data such as medical and
genomic information, places limitations on data sharing
due to privacy requirements [2, 3]. Access to human gen-
omic data through resources such as dbGaP involves gov-
ernance systems based on managed access rather than
completely free sharing of data. However, as noted above,
human data and the particular privacy and access con-
cerns associated with it are not the primary focus of this
paper, which is concerned with policies promoting the
sharing of scientific data more broadly.
The specificities of Open Data requirements vary by
funder, but the underlying ethos is that scientists have a
responsibility to make research data “openly available to
the maximum extent, and with as few restrictions as,
possible, through deposit in digital repositories” ([29],
p. 51). The emphasis on prepublication data treats
observations, recordings and measurements (made in
the course of a scientific experiment or otherwise) as
research outputs in themselves. Unlike their deployment
in scientific publications, these pre-publication data are
seen to have value separate from their use as evidence to
support a particular scientific claim [26]. These data sets
are regarded as generative of new knowledge, both in
isolation and especially when combined with other
data sets [26, 29]. Thus in Open Data discussions
data are increasingly framed as the basis of both sci-
entific practice and knowledge, prompting claims that,
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in effect, ‘science is data and that data are science’
([30], p. 649).
Open Data also marks a significant shift from trad-
itional models of what dissemination means for scien-
tists. Where previously scientists might have decided to
share data sets with selected others on the basis of per-
sonal acquaintance or reputation, Open Data policies
have transformed the issue from ‘whether to share’ to
‘how to share’ [2]. In Open Data, at least from the funder’s
perspective, databases and repositories have replaced jour-
nals as the dissemination infrastructure of choice. These
infrastructures are designed to place data ‘out there’ for
reuse and reinterpretation. The anticipated maximisation
of production of new knowledge is understood to require
a corresponding minimisation of control over access to
data sets retained by individual scientists and groups. The
responsible scientists’ duty in Open Data terms is there-
fore to disseminate as much as possible as quickly as
possible by placing their data in such repositories with
minimal barriers or restrictions to access and reuse.
Data in translation
The particular understandings of what constitute ‘data’
and how data move (data journeys) enshrined in the
Open Data and dual use discussions both have implica-
tions for how translation is understood to occur. Open
data discussions tend to regard even pre-analysis data
(so-called ‘raw’ data) as fundamentally generative of sci-
entific knowledge, as though translation was largely a
matter of analysis. However, scientific data do not ‘speak
for themselves’; they require interpretation to render
them useable and, indeed translatable. This is demon-
strated in practice by the requirement for metadata;
information about the circumstances in which scientific
data was collected or generated, including the tools and
methods used, the purposes for which the data was
originally collected and the circumstances under which
collection occurred to enabling the use and reuse of data
[31, 32]. This kind of contextual information also allows
scientists to make judgements about the quality of data
when deciding whether or not to use data produced by
others [33].
Published journal articles are more likely to contain
details of the methods and tools used in generating a set
of scientific findings. However, it is still a mistake to
consider a journal article a self-contained ‘recipe’ for
(re)producing a particular scientific finding as the dual
use literature is in danger of doing. It is rare that scien-
tific journal articles report all of the contingencies and
uncertainties encountered during an experiment or piece
of fieldwork, rather representing a formalised, stylised
account of events produced in accordance with the publi-
cation culture of science [34]. It also requires infrastruc-
ture, equipment, expertise, tacit knowledge and practical
know-how to reuse data whether pre-analysis or post-
publication. These elements of translation are not
adequately addressed by either Open Data or dual use
discussions.
Opposing ethical responsibilities, or a need to refocus on
practice?
The dual-use and Open Data discourses evolved for
different purposes from different policy communities.
This situation is exacerbated by the fact the two policy
communities rarely engage with one another. Open Data
literature generally does not unpack, let alone address
dual use concerns, and vice versa. Nonetheless this in
itself should not mean that the two positions are incom-
mensurable and that a unified, holistic approach to re-
sponsible data management cannot be achieved. Two
key concerns, however, stand in the way—first, that the
vocabulary and concepts used to discuss data are mark-
edly different in the dual-use and Open Data discussions.
The two discussions make use of different interpretations
of what constitutes “data”, its value independent of experi-
mentation, and how it moves between research contexts,
which necessarily shapes how actions of sharing data are
envisioned [32]. Second, that the manner in which data
are dissemination are discussed in both fields of discourse
is often abstracted and removed from the daily practices
of scientific research. How and when to share data in
manners that embody these various responsibilities re-
mains unclear.
It is important to note that these situations may not be
“true” ethical problems, but instead “wicked problems” in
that they are difficult to solve because of incomplete or
contradictory requirements, rather than inherent conflict
[35]. Nonetheless, the inability for scientists to act accord-
ing to all the responsibilities assigned to them can cause
‘ethical erosion,’ [36, 37], meaning that the sustained in-
ability to act according to the ethical expectations set out
in regulations, policy or teaching may cause scientists to
cease to see value in the ethics guidelines and act unethic-
ally [38]. These issues are thus very important to consider
in the context of responsible conduct of research.
Discussion
Considering definitions of “data”
Open Data policies have tended to define data as a-
contextual, readily exchangeable ‘units’ of information.
This type of pre-publication data is sometimes regarded
as ‘raw’ data. The expression is something of a mis-
nomer as even data points deposited wholesale in a data-
base will be subject to some sort of organisation and
annotation designed to ‘make sense’ of them. A suitable
alternative description might be ‘pre-analysis’ data, as it
describes data that have been ordered and standardised
to some degree but which has not yet been interpreted
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and interrogated to produce the results that would form
the basis of a scientific publication.
Dual-use literature, by contrast, focuses primarily on
data that has been extensively collated and analysed, es-
pecially when organised in the form of peer-reviewed
journal articles. Both of these interpretations can easily
become too abstract—particularly for individual scien-
tists. In a world where the quantity of research data is
increasing exponentially it is often difficult for individual
scientists to understand their roles—and responsibilitie-
s—in the ethics of data production [39].
In this respect, large scale genomic (and proteomic)
data sharing projects like the HGP are potentially poor
models on which to base standards for scientific data
sharing as they involve large amounts of highly standar-
dised, homogeneous data which is actually in contrast to
many areas of the life sciences [21]. Social scientists
studying the data practices in the life and physical sci-
ences have generally taken a broader approach to defin-
ing what counts as ‘data’ [21, 33]. In a series of case
studies of data use in different life sciences domains, the
Research Information Network [21] found that scientists
combine multiple, heterogeneous data types such as
genomic profiles, scans and image data, medical histor-
ies, taxonomic classifications, transgenic organisms, lab
books, published papers, protocols, Standard Operating
Procedures, information from public and controlled ac-
cess databases, specialist wikis, advice from colleagues,
conference proceedings, laboratory demonstrations, tool
kit instructions, mathematical algorithms, statistical soft-
ware programmes, fieldwork, and readings from experi-
mental apparatus. These different information sources
are combined in multiple, iterative stages from the initial
planning of an investigation to the journal article sub-
mitted for publication. Thus the scope of information
required for scientific practice is broader and more
heterogeneous than that commonly envisaged by either
Open Data or dual-use policies.
Refocusing on what happens “on the ground, in the lab”
might then be a way of gainfully integrating these different
discussions. . If discussions on data responsibility devel-
oped a holistic view of daily data production that takes
into account the entire range of data types and engage-
ment activities—from data generation, storage and cur-
ation to dissemination and re-use—it would not only
assist scientists in understanding their roles but also elim-
inate some of the confusion inherent in the terminology
employed by different dialogues. What is vital for such a
discussion, however, is a careful re-examination of the
current ways in which “data” are discussed.
Defining dissemination: data movements
In recent years authors such as Leonelli have drawn
attention to the important role of “data journeys” within
the new data-centric research paradigm [26, 40] The
ideals of the Open Data movement, she points out, can
only be realised if movement of data is facilitated [26].
Similarly, the threats of dual-use arise when data is
moved from one context to another—between institu-
tions or communities. How—and what—data moves re-
mains a topic of intense discussion. Leonelli suggests
([26], p. 6) that: “the vast majority of scientific data gen-
erated in the second half of the 20th century have only
been accessed by small groups of experts; and very few of
those data, selected in relation to the inferences made by
the scientists who analyzed them, have been made pub-
licly available through publication in scientific journals”.
What is important in this observation is twofold. First,
that publications account for only a small amount of the
data that are generated, and second that scientists are
highly influential in deciding what data are shared and
what not.
Large databases are increasing the mobility of data,
although certain types of data, such as genome sequences,
are better served by online resources than others. In
addition to databases, the internet also offers an increasing
range of innovative platforms for sharing scientific data
including personal websites, e-books, discussion forums,
email lists, blogs, wikis, videos, audio files, RSS feeds and
P2P file-sharing networks [41]. These platforms, as well as
so-called “altmetric” initiatives—crowdsourcing, social
networking and so forth—mark a significant departure
from both the formal, peer-review approach of journal
publication which dual use discourses focus on and the
databases that are at the heart of Open Data policies.
Moreover, increasing innovations in data movement path-
ways are allowing data to move between disciplines, com-
munities and from researchers to the public in previously
unprecedented ways.
Scientists, in their data sharing activities thus have to
contend with deciding what data to share, and what
methods, including which ICT platform(s), should be
employed to share it [21, 32, 42]. These options can be
thought of as particular data dissemination pathways.
Deciding on a pathway involves scientific and logistical
concerns, but also has ethical consequences. These ethical
issues relate to who can benefit from the pathways—and
who can exploit them. Considerations that need to be
taken into account when assessing possible dissemination
pathways include the cultural and linguistic assumptions
underlying their design [42], the ICT resources necessary
to exploit them, the cost of using them [41], and their
integrity from safety and security perspectives.
Thinking about data journeys is thus important for
both Open Data and dual-use discussions. In particular,
it highlights the “messiness” inherent in modern data
sharing, and the important role that scientists play as
not only data generators, but also selectors of the data
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that are released online and where it are released to. This
necessitates that the ethical responsibilities of data man-
agement amongst scientists be revisited. If the structures
are in place to facilitate it, there is no particular limit to
how data can move across communities or institutions.
The responsibility of scientists must therefore be located
in the small data transactions of daily research. Scientists
thus need to recognise the ethical import of each data
transaction—no matter how small or routine. Being crit-
ically aware not only about what is shared, but where is
a vital component of ethical behaviour.
“Micro-movements”: Rethinking responsibility for
scientific data
The current literature examining data in scientific re-
search highlights two important considerations: that
what constitutes “data” is ever increasing, as are the
ways in which these “data” move through the online en-
vironment. Moreover, the fundamental role that the in-
dividual scientist plays in these two considerations
becomes evident when they are critically assessed. Indi-
vidual scientists, it can be suggested, are in control of
what to use/share, and how to use/share it. Indeed, all
downstream data actions are dependent on these initial
decisions made by individual scientists.
The RIN study on data sharing practices asked scien-
tists to fill in “data journals”, mapping out what data
moved in and out of their research context on a daily
basis [21]. What was evident from this study was the
myriad of small data transactions-or “micro-movements”
that occur on a daily basis. The idea of “micro-move-
ments” of data represents the daily activities that the
individual scientist encounters that involve data being
moved on- or off-line, and across the myriad different
data distribution channels outlined above. These move-
ments are controlled not only by regulation, tradition or
expediency, but also, as discussed previously, by the tacit
knowledge, personal preferences and prejudices of the
individual scientist.
A focus on data micro-movements suggests a way to
balance dual-use and Open Data concerns and to bring
them together in a way that lays the foundations for a
more contextually-sensitive approach to discussions on
responsible conduct of research. Focusing on the data
interactions that happen within the daily research activ-
ities of a specific laboratory context removes much of
the abstract nature of both dual-use and Open Data
discussions. It offers a way to discuss ethical res-
ponsibilities in a manner that relates to the agency of
individual scientists and of scientific research groups,
something which is often crucial in stimulating dis-
cussions on responsibility [43]. For scientists this re-
sponsibility can be framed according to the following
requirements:
 That the individual scientist assesses where the data
are coming from—does the origin of the data raise
concerns?
 That the individual scientist considers where the
data are going to—does it increase the potential for
beneficial re-use?
 That the individual scientist considers whether the
future location of the data is ethically sound—what
structures are in place to uphold the integrity of the
data and ameliorate harms?
For Open data and dual-use advocates, the require-
ments are twofold; first to come together to produce
shared guidelines on responsible data management for
scientists, and second, for those guidelines to focus on the
everyday data practices of scientists rather than abstract
conceptions of “data”. In particular it would be beneficial
for updated guidelines to provide advice on how to assess
whether particular types of data are suitable for sharing on
particular types of platform. As a move from the general
to the specific it would even be worth considering what
characteristics of the data in question and of the possible
dissemination methods are most ethically relevant, and
practical to assess when scientists are making decisions
about what to share and how to share it.
Finally, the level of autonomy and agency attributed to
the individual scientist has the potential to affect the
amount of responsibility that can be designated to
them—but also to how responsibility is framed collect-
ively. This is especially important considering the increas-
ing complexity and scope of life science research which
has led to the evolution of a highly collaborative, group-
based research community in which each scientist con-
tributes but does not control the entirety of a research
project [44, 45]. In framing collective and individual
responsibilities for data micro-movements, the work of
May [46, 47] is relevant. May proposed that an action was
legitimately collective if the individuals in question are
related to each other so as to enable each to act in ways
that they could not manage on their own. The common
moral element allows making decisions self-consciously.
Through this, each member of the group comes to have
the same intention, either reflectively or pre-reflectively
(shared interests and attitudes, solidarity) ([46], p. 64).
Thus, while scientists have individual responsibility for the
“micro-movements” of their data, there is an element of
collective, negotiated responsibility due to the combined
actions necessary to construct the pathways along which
data moves.
Concluding comments: teaching responsible data
management
This paper reviews the challenges posed for scientists
by the conflicting models of responsible scientific data
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sharing envisaged by Open Data and dual use frame-
works. Contemporary ethical and policy discussions
on data management are disparate and use differing
interpretations of key concepts. Moreover, these dis-
cussions—by virtue of their abstracted, global perspecti-
ve—often make it difficult for individual scientists and
scientific groups to interpret these requirements in ways
that are meaningful for everyday scientific practice at the
local level.
Instead it is proposed that a new focus on individual
responsibility to discussions on ethical data management
that emphasise the plurality of data and data usage in
science and highlight the wide range of data interactions
that individual scientists have on a daily basis. We feel
that teaching data management from the perspective of
“micro-movements” is valuable for future ethics peda-
gogy as it necessitates that scientists consider not only
the wide range of data that they are potentially sharing
as of equal value for future re-use, but also be cognizant
of the structures of where data has come from or is
potentially going to. This will necessitate that the data
sharing structures be carefully considered from an ethical
perspective—including issues such as access, egalitarian-
ism, security and benefits.
As scientists are already careful and critical about who
they micro-share with—both as receivers and donors
of data [48, 49]—a focus on micro-movements will be
strengthened by tapping into the informal cultures,
tacit knowledge and personal preferences that already
exist to govern these behaviours. The possibilities for
incorporating such teaching into current science curricula
are myriad—from training mentors and supervisors to
facilitate more attention to these issues in laboratory
contexts, to incorporating these issues into discussion on
data generation and management within undergraduate
courses.
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Endnotes
1For example, this is question 11 off the Wellcome
Trust small grant application. This wording is similar in
most other funding applications from the Trust and
prevalent in other funding bodies’ application forms as
well. http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corpora
tesite/@msh_grants/documents/web_document/wtp0598
21.pdf (accessed 13/05/2016).
2See the Wellcome Trust’s data sharing policy at
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Policy/Spotlight-
issues/Data-sharing/Guidance-for-researchers/ (accessed
13/05/2016).
3Van der Bruggen ([7], p 749) identifies a number of
different drivers for this securitization aside from the 9/11
terrorist attacks. He suggests that the increasing focus of
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
on bioterrorism, the emergence of new infectious diseases
such as AIDS, SARS and Bird Flu, rapid globalization,
and increasingly international terrorist groups such as
al Qaeda have all contributed to the emergence of this
discourse.
4These experiments of concern were identified as
research that could:
1) Enhance the harmful consequences of a biological
agent or toxin.
2) Disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of
immunization without clinical and/or agricultural
justification.
3) Confer to a biological agent or toxin, resistance
to clinically and/or agriculturally useful prophylactic
or therapeutic interventions against that agent or
toxin or facilitate their ability to evade detection
methodologies.
4) Increase the stability, transmissibility, or the ability
to disseminate a biological agent or toxin.
5) Alter the host range or tropism of a biological
agent or toxin.
6) Enhance the susceptibility of a host population.
7) Generate a novel pathogenic agent or toxin, or
reconstitute an eradicated or extinct biological
agent.
5Indeed, there have been concerns about the efficacy
of employing censorship to control biosecurity concerns.
It has been suggested that this approach not only under-
mines the openness of science, but also the trust and
confidence that the international community has in scien-
tific research [13].
6Of course this is a simplification of the representation
of data in dual-use discourse, but nonetheless valid for
the argument we develop in this paper.
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